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INTRODUCTION
The current food safety standards are based on the implicit as-
sumption that the food that people traditionally have eaten is fundamentally
risk-free. This may be an accurate assumption in the context of risks from acute
health eects of poisonous foods. However, this assumption cannot be main-
tained in the context of risks from chronic health problems, such as cancer. The
current regulatory scheme reects people's irrational bias against non-natural
carcinogenic foods. This scheme has proven to be relatively unworkable, and has
led to an examination of the wrong issues in attempting to eliminate the health
risks from carcinogenic foods. Indeed, the focus on a food's recipe in the context
of carcinogens has caused us reduce the risks of cancer ineciently. This paper
will present proposals that will make the food safety standards for carcinogens
consistent. This will allow for the reduction of the risk from carcinogens in a
more cost-eective manner. This paper will also consider the implications of
risk perception and risk communication research in formulating eective risk
management policies.
I. THE BASIC PROBLEM
A. The Importance of Risk Perception in Our System of Govern-
ment
1In a democratic system such as ours, people's beliefs and prefer-
ences are often enacted into law. Implicit in our determination that such a
democratic legal system is wise rests an assumption that people are capable of
governing themselves. That is, we believe that citizens will not elect legislators
who will consistently design laws that are not in the citizens' best interests.
With regard to the regulation of substances which are harmful to humans, the
assumption translates to a belief that our democratic processes will eect laws
which will protect people from these harmli.il substances. Of great importance
in determining whether a set of laws will in fact protect the public rather than
exposing the public to risks is the public's perception of those risks.
In an ideal world, people would be able to perceive the risks that
surround them accurately and take appropriate precautions through laws or
otherwise. However, current literature regarding the public perception of risk
reveals that we do not live in such a utopia.
B. The Basic Tenets of Risk Perception Research
During the past 15 years a great deal of research has been con-
ducted to discover what risk means to people. Ostensibly, this research will
enable health and safety regulators to better perform their task.1 Studies have
conclusively determined that people perceive risk as being more than merely
a calculation of the expected number of fatalities from an activity.2 Thus, the
public's perception of risk appears to be more robust than the technical approxi-
1See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280 (1987). However, actual at-
tempts to utilize this risk perception research have not been easy. See William D. Ruckeishaus,
Risk in a Free Society, 4 RISK A.j,xiysis 157 (1984).
2See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENcE 280 (1987); Paul Slovic, Informing
and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 RIsK ANALYSIs 403(1986).
2mations of risk given by experts.3 Although the public perceives risks dierently
than experts, the public's perceptions cannot be dismissed as being irrational.
People do not ordinarily have complete information when assessing complex
risks and therefore must resort to using mental shortcuts, called heuristics, to
respond to various risks.4 These heuristics necessarily are not always eective;
there are certainly limits to people's rationality.5 The public perception of food
safety risk is an example of people's heuristics leading to severe and persistent
biases.
C. The Biases in the Public's Perception of Food Safety Risks:
The Fear of Anything Added to Natural Foods6
The basic psychometric theory of risk perception predicts that peo-
ple will generally perceive risks of an unknown technology to be greater than
the risks of a known technology.7 This bias is not necessarily irrational. In the
context of acute health risks, people are rational to recognize that traditional
foods are safer than new foods, because the traditional foods have not displayed
any poisonous eects in the past. Additionally, with incomplete information,
people may be correct to view cautiously activities which may have a delayed,
3Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks,
12 RIsK ANALYSIS 215 (1992).
4See generally, Di~NIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL. EDS., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURIsTICs AND BIASES (1982).
5See, e.g., Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, 248 SCIENCE
559 (1990); see generally Baruch Fischho et al., ACCEPTABLE RIsK (1981).
6This paper discusses the bias against products which distort nature. This subsumes the
bias against synthetic or articial products. To illustrate (in the context of animal drugs),
the bias that this paper discusses would be against giving any groi~th producing hormones
to an animal. The bias would include feeding cows synthetic compounds (such as DES) and
feeding cows naturally occurring compounds (such as estrogen) that they don't normally get
in their diet. Henceforth, I shall refer to the bias against products which distort nature and
the bias against articial products interchangeably.
7Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987).
3unobservable, or unforeseen eect. This bias is especially evident in the context
of cumulative and delayed food risks, most notably the risk of cancer.8 In the
context of food safety, this bias is reected in reasoning such as: Natural food
must be safe... people have eaten it for hundreds of years. In eect, people
perceive a world in which nature is safe and anything added to nature is unsafe.
The bias against additions to nature is enhanced by many factors.
The regulatory system that we have established amplies the bias by making
the public aware of the risks of articial additives rather than natural foods.
Mar, DES, saccharin and similar non-natural compounds come to mind when
people think of the risk from food. News media coverage of hazards of these
articial compounds signals people that these are the types of risks with which
they should be concerned.9 Risks are communicated and amplied through a
complex combination of social and cultural mechanisms.10 Once formed, strong
beliefs are hard to modify.11 Furthermore, people have diculty comprehending
low-probability events, and systematically overestimate the probability of low-
8See id Cancer is particularly feared because of its dreaded nature. Cancer is a risk that
is perceived as being untreatable. potentially global, involuntary, and posing a risk to future
generations. Dreaded is another type of risk that the psychometric model predicts people will
be biased against. Id
9See, e.g., How a PR Firm Executed the Alar Scare, WALL Sr. J.. Oct. 3, 1989, at A22.
10Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplication of Risk: A Conceptual Framework,
8 RISK ANALYSIS 177(1988). In the food safety context, Lewis A. Segall has noted: The
case of alar on apples seems a good example of how cultural meanings (in this instance the
possibility of cancer in the school lunchbox) may play a signicant role in shaping regulatory
policy .. Food regulation. .. operates in a world of cultural meanings. The point is not
that these cultural meanings are wrong or misguided, much less that they should determine
regulatory decisions. Rather it is that accounting for culture may give a fuller account of the
dynamics of regulatory policy. Letter from Lewis A. Segall to Peter B. Hutt (April 12, 1990)
in PETER B. Hurr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 36 (2d ed. 1991).
11Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 RisK ANALYSIS 403,
405 (1986). Generally, new evidence that conrms one's initial beliefs is accepted as reliable;
conversely, new evidence that contradicts one's initial beliefs is dismissed as unreliable. See
id
4probability events.12 The most heavily regulated food safety risks { those from
carcinogens { usually represent extremely small probabilities. However, people
cannot readily perceive the dierence between probabilities of 1 0~' and 1 0~,
and thus cannot readily understand health standards which distinguish between
the two. If people cannot dierentiate between these probabilities, they are even
more likely to rely on their bias against additions.
D. The Bias Against Additions to Nature is Irrational for Carcino-
gens
As discussed above, it is not necessarily irrational for people to be
more skeptical of articial products than natural products. The heuristic that
people use is simple: people live for a long time today and therefore nature
cannot be very h~l... what we really have to watch out for new foods that
people haven't eaten for centuries. This heuristic may be use.il, but only up
to a point. The logical fallacies in this reasoning are apparent. First, people are
not immortal. It may be the very foods that we have consumed for hundreds
of years that cause us to live for only seventy years.13 Second, people's diets
are not constant across time or cultures. Many of us are eating plants (such as
coee and potatoes) that are ancestors did not. In addition to the faulty logical
reasoning of this heuristic, recent scientic evidence has called into question the
basic assumption that nature is safe.
12See Zeckhauser & Viscusi. supra note 5. at 559; Fischho, supra note 5.
13This issue can be viewed in a more scientic framework. There is no reason to think that
natural selection would eliminate the hazard of carcinogenicity of a toxin that causes cancer
in old age past the reproductive age. Natural selection would, however, lead to a resistance
to acute eects of carcinogens. See Bruce N. Ames et al.. Ranking Possible Carcinogenic
Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271, 277 (1987).
5The concern about controlling the risks of non-natural food car-
cinogens is misplaced given the signicant amount of new evidence showing that
the risk of cancer from natural foods dwarfs the risk from non-natural foods.
Scientic studies have examined a variety of natural foods and concluded that
their carcinogenic potential is often greater than many additives that have been
banned because of their carcinogenicity.14 This scientic evidence has led the
director of the
FDA's Oce of Toxicological Studies to conclude that the risk..,
from natural carcinogens in the diet... overwhelm the risk from food additives.15
Furthermore, although about half of all the articial chemicals tested in labs
have been found to be carcinogenic16, leading risk assessors have concluded that
14See. e.g., Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE
271 (1987); Bruce N. Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE 1256
(1983); see also Prival, Carcinogens and Niutagens Present as.Vatural Components of Food
or Induced by Cooking, 6 Nutr. Cancer 236 (1985); Doll & Peto. The Causes of Cancer:
Quantitative Estimates of A voidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L
CANCER INsT. 1192. 1256 (1981) (estimating that approximately 35 percent of all cancer
deaths are caused by diet, but only approximately 1 percent are caused by food additives);
COMMrITEE ON DIET, NUTRmON, AND CANCER OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, DIET, NurRrrION AND CANCER (1982) (suggesting a highly Si~~~t correlation
between traditional foods and cancer incidence).
15Healthy Food.ijania Rolls on, but How Healthy is Healthy? Frozen Foods in North Amer-
ica, 32 QUICK FROZEN FOODS INT'L 201(1990) (quoting Dr. Robert J. Scheuplein).
Dr. Scheuplein has concluded that over 98 percent of the cancer risk in the human diet comes
from natural carcinogens or from cooking foods. Experts Question Science Behind Health and
Safety Regulations, PR NEWSWIRE (FINANCIAL NEWS) (May 21. 1991); Daniel P. Puzo,
Pesticide Cancer Risk Downplayed, L.A. TIMEs, July 19, 1990, at H2. Although Scheuplein's
assumptions have been challenged by some health advocates (see Lisa Y. Leerts, Carcino-
gens au naturel? Claims That Natural Carcinogens Outweigh the Risks from Pesticides, 17
NUrRITION ACTION NEWSLE'I-rER 1 (CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST) (July 1990)), his conclusions are largely a result of the accurate assumption that
people eat a great deal more natural food than chemical compounds. See Hemmimki et al., 1
J. ENVIRON. SCI. HEALTH 55 (1983). Furthermore, Dr. Scheuplein's qualications as the
leading FDA risk assessment ocial have not been called into serious question.
16See, e.g., Haselman et al., Results from 86 Two-Year Carcinogenicity Studies Conducted
by the National Toxicology Program. 14 J. Tox. & ENVIRON. HEALTh 621, 634 (1984).
See also Richard A. Merrill, FDA 's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of
Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to ScientWc Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REQ.
1, 17-18 (1988) (describing results of some NTP studies).
6this same proportion may very well hold for natural foods.17 Thus, it appears
that the public fear of articial additives is misplaced given the high incidence
of naturally occurring carcinogens. We certainly don't live in a world in which
nature is benevolent.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME:
JIRRATIONALITY REFLECTED AND AMPLifIED
The previous section discussed how people have a general bias
against non-natural additives to food. This section will examine how the cur-
rent food safety standards both reect this bias and amplify it. The food safety
provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) are based on an
unstated assumption that a traditional diet of natural foods is risk free. This
assumption may be proper in the context of acute health risks. However, in
light of the current evidence, this assumption should not be maintained in the
context of the risks from cancer.
Furthermore, the food safety standards magnify people's natural
bias against articial substances by maintaining a regulatory system that calls
the safety of those substances into question without examining the same risks
in natural substances. Finally, this section will examine the inconsistencies in
the FD&C Act that the FDA and the courts have attempted to make workable.
A. A Statutory Overview18
17Robert E. Taylor, Puttin the Money Where the Math Is, GOVERNMENT ExEC. (Apr.
1990) (referring to the conclusions of various government ocials).
18This discussion is only intended to highlight the dierential treatment of natural and
added ingredients under the FD&C Act. For a complete and insightful discussion of the ner
nuances of the food safety provisions of the FD&C Act see Richard A. Merrill, Regulating
Carcinogens in Food: A Legislator's Guide to the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 MICH. L. REv. 171(1979).
7The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 originally dened an adulterated
food as one that contained any added poisonous or other deleterious ingredient
which may render such article injurious to health. 19 Since that time, the federal
food safety provisions have drawn a distinctions between harmful ingredients
that are added to food and harmful ingredients naturally occurring in food.
Congress enacted the present FD&C Act in 1938 to expand the regulation of
toxic substances in food. Section 402(a)( 1) states that a food is adulterated
[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which
may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added
substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the
quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious
to health. 20
The legislative history of the 1938 Act reveals that Congress was
aware that some naturally occurring foods were hazardous, but inserted the
second clause to avoid over-zealous FDA enforcement against those foods.21 In
section 406, Congress also allowed for the establishment of tolerance levels for
added constituents that were necessary or unavoidable in particular foods.22
The 1938 Act thus had three standards that applied depending on how a sub-
stance entered a food: (1) section 402(a)( 1 )'s ordinarily injurious standard
applied to constituents that were not added; (2) section 402(a)( 1 )'s may ren-
der injurious standard applied to added constituents that were neither necessary
19Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915,  7. 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
2021 U.S.C.  342(a)(1) (1994)
21See Merrill, supra note 18, at 186-87.
2221 U.S.C.  346 (1994)
8or unavoidable; and (3) section 406 established tolerances for added constituents
whose use was necessary or unavoidable.
Since 1938, Congress has amended the FD&C Act by carving out
four categories of substances that are added to food for special treatment. Sub-
stances in each of these four categories must be approved by the FDA prior to
their use in food. In 1954, Congress enacted the Pesticide Residues Amend-
ment, now section 408 of the FD&C Act.23 In 1958, Congress enacted the Food
Additives Amendment, embodied in section 409 of the FD&C Act.24 In 1960,
Congress added the Color Additives Amendment, now section 706 of the FD&C
Act.25 Finally, in 1968, Congress enacted the Animal Drug Amendments, now
section 512 of the FD&C Act.26
One of the main problems of the current statutory scheme for the
regulation of carcinogens is that food and drug regulation was initially designed
to deal with acute causes of death.27 As we have seen, the bias against non-
natural substances may be rational in this context. However, the bias against
non-natural substances is irrational in the context of carcinogens. Instead of es-
tablishing a dierent system for evaluating the carcinogenicity of foods, Congress
has t safety determinations for carcinogenic foods into the distinctions that
were initially created to prevent the risk of death from acute eects. The result
is an irrational policy for controlling the risks of carcinogens.28
2321 U.S.C.  346a (1994)
2421 U.S.C.  348 (1994)
2521 U.S.C.  376 (1994)
2621 U.S.C.  360b (1994)
27See Peter B. Hun, Food and Drug Law: A Strong and Continuing Tradition, 37 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 123, 127 (1982).
28The arguments established in this paper apply equally to other forms of chronic disease.
9B. The Djferential Treatment of Natural and Added Constituents
As discussed above, the FD&C Act generally categorizes and regu-
lates food constituents based on their origin. For the purposes of our discussion,
the constituents can be divided into three broad categories:
(1)Natural constituents of agricultural commodities (e.g., oxalic
acid in spinach, ascorbic acid in oranges)
(2)Environmental contaminants of food, which are unavoidable in
some foods (e.g., aatoxins in peanuts, PCBs in sh)
(3)Substances used intentionally as food ingredients (e.g., sugar,
sodium nitrite, food colorings) and substances that become constituents of food
through their intentional use for other purposes (e.g., food packaging materials,
animal drugs, and pesticides)
Thus, although the same constituent may fall into more than one
category, it will be regulated dierently depending on how it became a part
of the nal food product. The FDA regulation of chemicals is therefore highiy
dependent on the natural vs. non-natural distinction. Furthermore, this natural
vs. non-natural distinction is crucial in determining a substance's treatment
within the third category.
I.Natural Constituents
Under section 402(a)( 1) of the FD&C Act, natural food con-
stituents are regulated under the ordinarily injurious standard. In order for
a substance to be considered ordinarily injurious, the substance must be injuri-
However, no other disease has seemed to catch the public's attention in quite the same way
as cancer.
10ous when eaten in ordinary quantities by ordinary consumers. The leading case
interpreting this provision, United States v. 1232 Cases of American Beauty
Brand Oysters,29 determined that the clause did not apply in the context of
oysters, some of which contained dangerous shell fragments. The ordinarily in-
jurious standard is rarely utilized by the FDA and is enforced primarily through
seizure or other court action.30
2.Unavoidable and Added Food Constituents
Unavoidable and added food constituents, such as environmental
contaminants, are currently regulated under two standards. First, the FDA
may bring an enforcement action under 402(a)( 1) against any food that bears
or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious
to health. The leading case interpreting the may render injurious standard is
United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co.31 The Court in this case stated
the particular individuals to whom the food might be fed could be taken into
account. Thus the strong and the weak, the old and the young, the well and
the sick need to be considered.32 Although this standard is easier to meet than
the ordinarily injurious standard, it too must be enforced through court action.
The second avenue that the FDA has used to regulate unavoidable
and added food constituents is through sections 402(a)(2)(A) and 406 of the
FD&C Act. Section 402(a)(2)(A) states that a food is adulterated if it bears or
contains any added poisonous or deleterious substance.., which is unsafe within
2943 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
30See Merrill. supra note 18, at 189.
31232 U.S. 239 (1914)
321d at 411.
11the meaning of section 406.... 33Section 406 allows the FDA to set tolerances
for these substances based on their potential harm and their avoidability.34 The
FDA is not required to establish tolerances under section 406.35 The FDA also
cannot regulate an environmental contaminant under both section 406 and the
may render injurious standard.36 Section 406 aords the FDA the benet of a
premarket approval scheme. However, the FDA has not often established formal
tolerances under section 406, and instead has often chosen to create informal
action levels to guide enforcement of section 402(a)( 1 ).37
3.Food Additive~Color Additives, 'Animal Drugs, and Pesticides
These 4 categories of constituents have been singled out for special
treatment by Congress based on their addition to foods. The regulation of these
substances is complex, and this paper will not explore the intricacies of each
provision. The regulation of these substances is stricter than the regulation
of substances under 402(a)(l) in two important ways: rst, each category is
regulated through a premarket approval process; second, each category (with
the exception of pesticides) gives special treatment to carcinogenic substances
3321 U.S.C.  342(a)(2)(A) (1994).
34Section 406 provides: any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except
where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good
manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for the purposes of the application of
clause (2)(A) of section 402(a); but when such substance is so required or cannot be so
avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or theron
to such extent as he nds necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity
exceeding the limits so xed shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of
clause (2)(A) of section 402(a).. .. In determining the quantity of such added substances to
be tolerated in or on dierent articles of food the Secretary shall take into account the extent
to which the use of such substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each
such article, and the other ways in which the consumer may be aected by the same or other
poisonous or deleterious substances. 21 U.S.C.  348 (1994).
35 See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
36See 21 U.S.C.  348 (1994).
37Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed.
Reg. 42743 (1994); see also Merrill, supra note 18, at 201 (explaining that the FDA's policy
is caused by the expense of the procedural requirements to set formal tolerances).
12through their Delaney Clauses. a.Premarket approval
The premarket approval system allows the FDA to enforce statu-
tory standards much more eectively than any court enforcement mechanism.
The failure of the original act to provide for the premarket approval of sub-
stances added was seen as a loophole.38 Many serious health eects could be
observed before the FDA could enjoin the use of a particular substance. The
premarket licensing scheme eectively shifts the burden of proof from the FDA
to the regulated industry. With a premarket approval system, the user must
prove a substance to be safe before it can sell the food; without a premarket
approval system, the FDA must prove the food to be unsafe before it removes
the food from the market. Under the premarket approval system, the FDA is
also permitted to establish conditions under which it believes the substances
can be safely used. b.Delaney Clause
The Delaney Clause was rst introduced along with the Food Ad-
ditive Amendments. Its proper interpretation has been a source of constant
struggle for the FDA, the courts and commentators.39 The Delaney Clause
was designed to prevent the addition to food of any substance that has been
shown to induce cancer in man or animals. The clause in the Food Additives
Amendment, now part of section 409 of the FD&C Act, is illustrative:
[N]o such regulation [authorizing the use of a food additive] shall
issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the Secretary - (A) fails to establish
38See S. REP. No. 2422. 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
39See generally Richard A. Merrill, FDA 's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repu-
diation of Congressional Choice or ReasonedAdaptation to Scientic Progress?, 5 YALE J.
ON REQ. 1 (1988).
13that the proposed use of the food additive, under the conditions of use to be
specied in the regulation, will be safe: Provided, That no additive shall be
found to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal,
or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety
of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal....40
The Delaney Clause in the color additive and animal drug provi-
sions is similar. Originally, the FDA did not have a dicult time applying the
Delaney Clause. In 1958, there were only four substances that were known to
induce cancer in humans.41 In the 1970s, the ability of science to detect sub-
stances added to foods which induce cancer (at some level) increased dramati-
cally.42 Thus, the FDA was forced to adopt policies to make the implementation
of the Delaney Clause reasonable. Through administrative policy, the FDA has
adopted a quantitative risk assessment method to evaluate the carcinogenicity
of substances. The FDA has determined that the level of risk to humans must
be greater than one in one million over a lifetime in order for a substance to
be declared unsafe under the Delaney Clause.43 However, an important court
decision has since stated that the FDA must declare a color additive unsafe if
it causes any risk of cancer in animals.44 Thus, color additives which pose a
4021 U.S.C.  348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
41Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics, 51
Fed. Reg. 28331(1986).
42See Merrill, supra note 37, at 12-16.
43In the context of animal drugs, see the FDA sensitivity of method approach. Chemical
Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for
Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17070 (1979). In the context of food and color additives,
FDA has declined to enforce the Delaney Clause against de minimis additives. See Monsanto
Co. v. Keunedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (allowing the de minimis exception to be
applied in the context of indirect food additives); Listing of D&C Orange No. 17 For Use
in Externally Applied Drugs and Cosmetics. 51 Fed. Reg. 28331(1986) (applying the de
minimis exception in the context of color additives).
44Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This case distinguished
14lifetime risk to humans of only one in nineteen billion must be banned by the
FDA.45
4.The statutory denition of a food additive excludes GRAS and
prior sanctioned substances
Another fundamental bias against substances which are non-natural
in a sense is embraced in the denition of a food additive under section 201(s)
of the FD&C Act. A food additive is dened as: any substance the intended
use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indi-
rectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise aecting the characteristics of
any food... if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts quali-
ed by scientic training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been
adequately shown through scientic procedures (or, in the case of a substance
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientic procedures or
experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use; except that such term does not include {
(4)any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph pursuant to this Act, the
Poultry Products Inspection Act or the Meat Inspection Act....
The denition applies to substances regardless of whether they can
be found in nature or are manmade. However, the GRAS and the prior sanctions
Monsanto by noting that Monsanto involved the denition of a food additive. Thus, although
the FDA may apply the de minimis exception to determine whether a substance is an additive,
it may not apply the de minimis exception to determine whether a color additive induces
cancer within the meaning of the Delaney Clause. It is unclear if the food additive or animal
drug Delaney Clauses will be interpreted similarly in the future. See also, the constituents
policy, discussed infra.
45See id
15exception leave many commonly used foods out of the premarket system of
regulation.46 Although a substance's GRAS status may be changed, once a
substance has been shown to have a prior sanction, it cannot be regulated
as a food additive. Thus, the denition of a food additive again reveals the
underlying premise of the FD&C Act: substances that we are have eaten in the
past are safe and it is only new substances that we must regulate strictly.47 The
FD&C Act also aords special treatment for color additives that were in use
prior to 1960, although in milder form.48
C. Determining Which Standard to Apply: Walking a Fine Line
The FD&C Act is structured by making distinctions based on the
origin of substances. Furthermore, these distinctions are critical in determining
whether a substance will be available to consumers. Thus, the FDA and the
courts have often considered the issue of how to classify a substance. This section
highlights the inconsistencies in the food safety regulations caused by the wide
divergence of standards discussed in the previous section. The interpretations of
the FD&C Act further illustrate the basic assumption of the Act that nature is
safe, and the FDA's and the courts' attempt to regulate sensibly given important
46The FDA lists substances that it considers to be GRAS. Furthermore, food processors
are free to determine for themselves which food susbstances they use are GRAS. See 50 Fed.
Reg. 27294 (1985); 53 Fed. Reg. 16544 (1988). This loophole, however, is rarely abused by
food processors. See PETER B. HUTr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUGLAW
332-33 (2ded. 1991).
47See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Chemical Additives in Food), Hearings before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956).
48Section 203 of the Color Additives Amendments allowed for the provisional listing of
color additives that were already in use in 1960 and were believed to be safe. Although the
provisional listing approach was designed as a transitional mechanism, FDA maintained a list
of provisionally approved color additives for almost 30 years, which led to litigation. See, e.g.,
Certied Color M.frs. Ass'n v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Mcllwain v. Hayes,
690 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16restrictions.
I.What is a Food Additive? a.The de minimis exception and the
constituents policy
The de minimis exception was discussed above in the contexts of
the food additive denition and the Delaney Clause. The application of the
de minimis exception represents a recognition by the FDA that a literal in-
terpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results. The second law of
thermodynamics teaches that any two substances that contact each other will
inevitably mix to some degree. In Monsanto v. Kennedy, the court avoided the
result of banning many food packaging materials by invoking the de minimis
doctrine to the denition of a food additive. However, the court in Public Citi-
zen v. Young refused to extend this reasoning to the Delaney context. The two
decisions thus create a stark tension: indirect food additives are regulated less
strictly than color additives, and possibly direct food additives.
The constituents policy is consistent with the de minimis exception
recognized in Monsanto. FDA takes the approach that:
.. [T]he detection of a trace amount of a known carcinogenic sub-
stance naturally present in a food, or unavoidably added to a food in the course
of its manufacture or processing does not invoke the anticancer clauses. It has
been pointed out, for example, that there are small amounts of estrogenic sub-
stances, which are regarded as carcinogenic, naturally present in many foods.
The anticancer clauses would be applicable, however, only if the food itself (con-
taining the naturally-occurring substance) were, upon feeding to test animals
17or some other appropriate test, found to induce cancer. If this were to happen,
the food itself would then be prohibited for use as a food additive{i.e., for any
use other than as an unprocessed raw agricultural commodity...49
The FDA adopted this policy out of necessity; otherwise it would
have been forced to bring thousands of foods under the strict premarket Delaney
regulations.50 Once again, this FDA policy highlights the intricate distinctions
that the FD&C Act draws between natural and non-natural constituents. The
constituents policy was upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Scott
v. Food and Drug Administration.51 Although the court in Public Citizens v.
Young distinguished the facts with those of Scott v. Food and Drug Admin-
istration, the application of the two cases leads to potentially absurd results.
To illustrate, suppose color additive A is found to be slightly carcinogenic in
rats (with a risk of 10-v). Color additive B contains 1 percent color additive A
and 99 percent of another component. Under Public Citizens v. Young, color
49'4griculture{Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1975, Hearings
before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). As a
point of interest, the FDA has appeared to adopt something similar to the constituents policy
in the context of irradiated food. The denition of a food additive includes any source of
radiation, but the FDA has interpreted this denition to require only the labeling of irradiated
food products, and not the labeling of foods containing irradiated ingredients. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 18992 (1981): 49 Fed. Reg. 5713 (1984); 51 Fed. Reg. 13376 (1986); 53 Fed. Reg.
53176 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 32335 (1989).
50The potential problems that the FDA would have encountered are illustrated by the FDA's
regulation of sassafras tea. This tea is made from the bark of the sassafras tea. The bark
contains safrole, from which it gets most of its avor. In the 1950s, the FDA determined that
safrole was carcinogenic. The agency therefore prohibited its addition to root beer and other
soft drinks. 25 Fed. Reg. 12412 (1960). However, the FDA recognized a problem with banning
sassafras bark. If the agency banned sassafras bark as a carcinogenic food additive under the
Delaney Clause, it would be forced to ban other natural substances that contained carcinogens
and were added to other foods. To avoid this result, the FDA distinguished sassafras bark by
saying it was not independently consumed as a food. See 38 Fed. Reg. 20040 (1973); 39 Fed.
Reg. 26748 (1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 34172 (1974): 41 Fed. Reg. 19207 (1976), codied in 21
C.F.R.  189.180; United States v Articles of Food Select Natural Herb Tea, Sassafras, etc.,
12 FDA consumer, No. 9, at 32 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The concurring opinion in United States
v. An Article of Food, 678 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1982), provides an excellent summary of the
sassafras tea case.
51728 F.2d 322 (1984).
18additive A cannot be added directly to a food in any amount. However, under
Scott, color additive B can be added to a food in almost any amount because
color additive A is considered a constituent and not an additive in this alternate
scenario. Furthermore, although in the Scott case the carcinogenic constituent
was an impurity, it would be virtually impossible for the FDA under the current
system to distinguish between impurities and intentionally added constituents.
Scott thus appears fundamentally irreconcilable with Public Citizens v. Young.
b.The scope of the GRAS exception
The GRAS exception for substances commonly used in food applies
upon a showing of a substantial history of consumption by a signicant number
of consumers in the United States.52 Important in the common use GRAS
exception is the fact that the substance must be shown to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use.53 Thus, the court in United States v. An Article
of Food held that potassium nitrate would not be considered GRAS for use in
beverages despite the fact that nitrates are naturally present in vegetables and
have long been used to cure meat. An obvious inconsistency results: the same
substance is an additive for new uses but not for old uses. New uses will require
premarket approval and be subject to the strict requirements of the Delaney
Clause, while old uses can only be regulated under the may render injurious
standard for added constituents under section 402(a)( 1). A product's GRAS
status is always subject to revocation based on evidence casting doubt on its
safety. However, the revocation approach that the courts have taken again favors
52See General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients. 41 Fed. Reg.
53600 (1976).
53United States v. An Article of Food, 752 F.2d 11(1st Cir. 1985)
19natural foods over non-natural foods.
The revocation of GRAS status for substances that are carcinogenic
presents interesting issues regarding the interaction between the denition of a
food additive and the Delaney Clause. Ocially, the FDA will not recognize
substances that are carcinogenic as GRAS.54 Since the substances then fall un-
der the denition of a food additive, they are then regulated under the Delaney
Clause.55 However, the FDA has adopted an important exception to the revoca-
tion of GRAS status because of its realization that most natural substances are
carcinogenic to some degree. Thus, although a substance found to be carcino-
genic in test animals cannot be regarded as GRAS, a substance that contains a
carcinogenic constituent can be regarded as GRAS.56 This GRAS constituents
policy leads to the confusing result that substances (such as mustard seed)
remain GRAS, while their primary avoring ingredients (such as allyl isothio-
cyanate) cannot rD#: 70403870 remain GRAS. The FDA was, in a sense, forced
to make this policy choice because of the severe divergence in the regulation of
natural and added substances. The FDA simply does not have the resources
to consider natural products as food additives and require premarket approval
and the application of the Delaney Clause. Thus, the FDA was consistent in
adopting both the constituents policy and the GRAS constituents policy.
2.Added vs. not added
54An example of this is the removal of cyclamate from the FDA's GRAS list because of
evidence of carcinogenicity. See 34 Fed. Reg. 17063 (1969).
55See Merrill, supra note 18, at 212.
56See, e.g.. 'Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1984, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 475 (1983).
20The FD&C Act fails to dene an added substance in section 402(a)(1).
The FDA and the courts have developed two dierent standards to determine
whether a substance is added. The FDA and some courts have adopted the
inherency standard, which posits that all substances that are not inherent in
the natural state of a food are added.57 Other courts have adopted an agency
theory, which posits that a substance can be considered added only if at least a
small amount is present due to human intervention.58 The choice of a denition
is critical to determine the proper treatment of substances, such as aatoxins
in corn and peanuts, that are not inherent in a substance yet are not caused by
man.59 If a substance is not added, it can only be regulated under the dicult
to enforce ordinarily injurious standard. However, if a substance is considered
added, it may be regulated under the may render injurious standard. Addition-
ally, formal tolerances may be established for some added constituents under
section 406, and the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer.60 The FDA
adopted the expansive denition of added substances because they saw a serious
potential health threat from substances, such as aatoxins, that were not added
by man. The illogic behind the dierent standards for added and non-added
substances can be illustrated by examining the FDA's inherency standard. If
spinach naturally contains oxalic acid, and oxalic acid is harmful to man, the
57See 21 C.F.R  109.3: see also United States v. Boston Farm Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 149
(5th Cir. 1979).
58See United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., 622 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1980); Continental
Seafoods, Inc. v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 38. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
59Aatoxins present in corn, peanuts, and other natural foods are a product of molds which
inevitably grow on these foods.
60Although formal tolerances have rarely been set, informal action levels, which also aid the
FDA's enforcement eorts, are more frequently set. See HurT & MERRILL, supra note 44,
at 907.
21FDA can ban spinach by proving spinach to be ordinarily injurious. However,
if corn contains aatoxins because of its symbiotic natural relationship with
mold, the FDA can ban corn by proving corn may be injurious. Additionally
(and more importantly), the FDA has the power to enact tolerances or action
levels for aatoxins in corn, but has no such power to regulate the level of oxalic
acid in spinach.
3.Added substance vs. 'food additive
The denitions of an added substance to food and a food additive
have led to some strange FDA policies. The FDA has established regulations
that state that environmental contaminants, such as PCBs, are added sub-
stances within the meaning of sections 402(a)( 1) and 406.61 Furthermore, the
FDA has determined that aatoxins in peanuts are added substances.62 How-
ever, the FDA's explanation for why PCBs are not food additives within the
meaning of section 409 has been less than convincing.63 Additionally, the FDA
has never attempted to explain why the peanuts containing carcinogenic aa-
toxins are not food additives when used to make peanut butter.64 The FDA's
approach in this area can again be seen as trying to nd a middle ground be-
tween the widely divergent standards applicable to natural food constituents
and non-natural food constituents.
D. Ad Hoc Fixes
61See Department of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Food & Drug Admin.: Poisonous or Dele-
terious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42743 (1974).
62See 39 Fed. Reg. 42748 (1974).
63See Merrill, supra note 37, at 23. The FDA reasoned that PCBs could not be food
additives because they performed no functional purpose in food. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42746
(1974).
645ee Merrill, supra note 37, at 23; Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974
(1986).
22Congress has had the chance to reexamine the inconsistencies and
biases in the food safety provisions a number of times. However, Congress has
chosen to x such problems on an ad hoc rather than a comprehensive basis.
Two of the more well-known incidents are in the context of DES and saccharin.
Such incidents have led the public to distrust the FDA and further focus on the
problems with articial ingredients.
I.The DES proviso
Congress enacted the DES proviso to eliminate one of the incon-
sistencies caused by the prior sanctioned uses exception to the food additive
denition. Thus, Congress decided to allow the continued approval of animal
drugs as long as no residues could be found in humans.65 However, as we
have seen in the context of both the GRAS exception and the prior sanctioned
uses exception, there is a bias against approving new food additives in gen-
eral. Congress chose to x only one aspect of the problem rather than xing its
source.
2.Saccharin
The FDA banned a series of non-nutritive sweeteners under the De-
laney Clause in the 1960s. Following the removal of cyclamate from the market
in 1970, saccharin was the only non-nutritive sweetener left on the market. In
1977, the FDA proposed to ban saccharin under the Delaney Clause after deter-
mining that it increased the risk of cancer by 4 out of 10,000 over a lifetime.66
Following this proposal, Congress interceded and forbade the FDA from banning
6521 U.S.C.  348 (1994).
66See. Saccharin and Its Salts: Proposed Rule Making, 42 Fed. Reg. 19996 (1977).
23saccharin. Instead, Congress required that warnings about the risk of cancer
be placed on all food containing saccharin.67 A few troubling consequences of
this saga should be noted. First, Congressional intervention caused saccharin to
have a monopoly on the non-nutritive sweetener market until the introduction
of aspartame in 1983. Not only did saccharin corner the market during this
time, it was also more dangerous than some of the other non-nutritive sweet-
eners that had already been banned.68 Furthermore, requiring a warning on
saccharin, but not on carcinogens with similar risks, such as peanut butter, has
led to increased public focus on the carcinogenic potential of articial ingredi-
ents. The labeling of saccharin has exacerbated people's built-in bias against
non-natural products.
LII. THE FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS ARE MISGUIDED TN
THEIR
APPROACH TO REDUCE THE RISK OF HARM FROM FOOD
As discussed above, the food safety provisions of the FD&C Act
implicitly assumes that we live in a world in which nature is benevolent. Rel-
atively recent scientic evidence shows that this basic assumption is improper.
Furthermore, because of its bias in favor of natural69 ingredients, the FD&C
6721 U.S.C.  343 (1994).
68AF-2 (furvifuramide) was banned with a risk more than a 100 times smaller than the
risk from saccharin. See Bruce N. Ames et al.. Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards,
236 SCIENCE 271, 273 (1987). Additionally, in1985 FDA's Cancer Assessment Committee
concluded that cyclamate is not a carcinogen, but other reports have stated that cyclamate
may be a tumor promoter or co-carcinogen. See Cyclamate Update, FDA Talk paper T89-
35(May 16, 1989).
69Again, this bias subsumes the bias against articial ingredients and also includes the bias
against eating things that haven't been a part of the human diet in the past. Thus, estrogens
that are naturally contained in a cow would be natural and any estrogens that wouldn't
normally be fed to cows would be non-natural.
24Act unwisely focuses on the origin of carcinogenic food constituents rather than
on their health eects. This focus has caused the FDA to needlessly litigate the
confusing boundaries of the dierent standards at a great expense.
A. The Bias in Favor of Natural Ingredients Results in Misplaced
Resources in Attempting to
Eliminate Health Risks
I.The Air Pollution Analogy and the Goal of Eective Regulation
The regulatory system under the FD&C Act can be analogized to
pollution emission limits under the Clean Air Act.70 The Clean Air Act is
premised on the assumption of a starting point of clean air. That is why it
is rational to try to prevent emissions into that clean air. However, if it were
discovered that the air emissions were only contributing about one percent of
the total air pollutants, while the remaining 99 percent was naturally occurring,
the rationale of the Clean Air Act would be called into question. People would
suggest that it would be wise to divert resources from curbing emissions to
reducing naturally occurring pollution. The goal would be to reduce the overall
level of emission as much as possible with as few resources as possible. We would
attempt to eliminate the risks in the most cost-eective manner. This is the
fundamental aw of the food safety provisions of the FD&C Act. Section 402(a)(
1), combined with the GRAS and prior sanctioned uses exceptions to the food
additive denition, basically make it impossible for the FDA to ban any natural
substance with long-term chronic health eects. In contrast, the provisions that
70This approach was suggested in Richard A. Merrill, Reducing Diet-Induced Cancer
Through Federal Regulation: Opportunities and Obstacles, 38 VAND. L. REV. 513, 522
(1985).
25govern food additives, color additives, animal drugs, and pesticides require the
FDA to ban useful substances that pose virtually no risk to human health. This
leads us to the inevitable conclusion that our current system makes us pay more
dollars for our products and end up with greater risks to our lives.71
2.The Just fcations for the Distinctions in the FD&C Act Merely
Reect the FD&C Act's Bias Against Non-Natural Foods.
Some have attempted to justify the dierential treatment of addi-
tives based on the principle that Congress wished to permit no additional human
cancer risk from food additives, color additives, or animal drugs. 72 This reason-
ing was embraced by the leading case that applied the general safety standard
to reject a new drug application for DES: The existence of natural estrogen in
foodstus does not warrant the intake of DES by a deliberate means of expo-
sure.73 However, this justication for the structure of the FD&C Act is awed in
two respects. First, the GRAS and prior sanctioned uses exceptions to the food
additives denition (combined with the constituents and GRAS constituents
policies) don't lead to a regulation of additives over non-additives. Instead,
they lead to a regulation of non-natural foods over natural foods. Second, this
justication ignores the fact the goal of the FD&C Act should be to reduce
health safety risks in the most cost-eective manner. The distinction between
adding to the risk and lowering the risk is useless; the costs and benets of
regulations must be weighed. This justication is premised on the same faulty
71See Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Within Reason, 248 SCIENCE 559,
560 (1990).
72Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17070 (1979).
73Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1966).
26assumption of the FD&C Act that natural foods are safe.
One commentator has attempted to justify the current system by
arguing that the diverse safety standards represent an assessment of the bene-
ts of the food categories rather than an assessment of the risks.74 Although
this justication makes some sense, it falls well short of completely defending
the widely divergent standards. According to this formulation, the FD&C Act
reects dierences in our capacity or willingness to limit human exposure to
various substances. Thus, it is easy for regulators to make it a crime to add
hazardous substances to food. It is more dicult for regulators to limit envi-
ronmental contaminants such as PCBs in sh. Finally, it would be even more
dicult to limit the exposure to unprocessed raw agricultural commodities.
This argument thus validly shifts the focus from the benets of avoiding various
health risks to the costs of avoiding various health risks75. The costs of avoiding
various health risks would involve the actual costs of the regulatory system in
addition to the costs of having to conform to the regulations. If we examine
the food safety provisions closely, however, we can see that this justication
for the dierent standards is not adequate. In fact, what are at rst glance
cost issues, upon reection become other examples of the bias that people have
against non-natural substances.
The costs of the regulatory system would appear to be higher for
unprocessed raw agricultural commodities than for food additives. However, the
costs of regulation would only be higher because of the large amount of natural
745ee Merrill. supra note 67, at 526.
75Alternatively, the argument can be thought of as shifting the focus from the costs of
having various health risks in foods to the benets of having various health risks in foods.
27substances in our diet. This is why a system that required premarket approval
of natural substances would cost more than a system that required premarket
approval of environmental contaminants or additives. However, this distinction
does not address the cost-eectiveness issue. Our goal should be to eliminate
health risks as cheaply as possible. It is not a proper response to assert that we
should regulate the minimal risks because there are so many greater risks that
would put a burden on our regulatory system.
Conforming to the food safety regulations leads to one of two costs:
the cost of a food being banned or, alternatively, the cost of eliminating the
health risk of that food.76 Again, at rst glance it might appear that the food
safety standards can be justied because the cost of banning natural substances
might be higher than the cost of banning food with environmental contaminants,
which would be higher than the cost of banning food constituents. However, it
is dicult to argue that the cost of banning a vegetable with many nutritional
substitutes (such as broccoli) is greater than the cost of banning a valuable
food additive with no nutritional substitutes (such as saccharin). It can be
generally asserted that people value natural foods more highly than additives
to nature. The wisdom77 and accuracy78 of this assertion can be doubted.
However, assuming its truth, the FDA bans so-called additives to nature (such
76It is also possible that the food will conform to the regulations without any cost.
77If people do value naturals foods more than non-naturals foods, it would most likely
be because of the perceived higher risks of natural foods. Again, this is the fundamental
assumption of the FD&C Act that ies in the face of scientic evidence.
78It is extremely hard estimate how people value particular foods. Thus, although a great
many people may consume broccoli, it is impossible to quantiI~' how much more pleasure they
get from consuming broccoli over consuming potential broccoli substitutes (such as asparagus,
cauliower, peas, etc.). Similarly, it is dicult to estimate the costs that manufacturers must
expend because they can only use food additives that have been approved by the FDA.
28as allyl isothiocyanate) that are the primary avor enhancers of natural foods
that it won't ban under the constituents policy or the GRAS exception (such as
mustard seed). Furthermore, the FD&C Act does not allow for individualized
determination of the benets of a food additive in determining whether it should
be banned. It implicitly assumes that natural substances are inherently more
valuable than non-natural substances, which is dubious given the known utility
of pesticides, animal drugs, and food and color additives.
The FD&C Act similarly cannot be justied on the grounds that it
is cheaper to eliminate the health hazards in food additives than in natural foods.
The FD&C is awed precisely because it provides no incentives whatsoever for
producers of agricultural commodities to eliminate the hazardous materials from
their products. Certainly, no suits will be successful against natural products
that have long-term health eects, such as broccoli. The constituents policy
combined with the GRAS constituents policy has the eect of locking out natural
products from the denition of food additives. Furthermore, any suits against
natural products under section 402(a)( 1) will undoubtedly be unsuccessful.
We cannot assess the potential ability to eliminate the risk of cancer
from natural substances. Technology follows the legal incentives provided for
it, and it is clear that the FD&C Act has not forced technology to develop
any methods to eliminate carcinogenic substances in natural foods. Instead,
the legal regime has provided incentives for manufacturers to develop a vast
number of non-natural products in the hope that some cost-eective ones will
pass the rigid requirements of the food safety standards. The FD&C Act does
29have one limited provision, section 406, which allows the FDA to set tolerances
for substances based on the ability of manufacturers to eliminate carcinogenic
constituents.79 However, this section is limited to unavoidable, added food
constituents. However, whether a constituent is added is a semantic question,
as evidenced by the various interpretations of added by the FDA and the courts.
There is no reasonable explanation for having tolerances for PCBs in sh (the
level of which sh producers have no control over) and not having tolerances
for allyl isothiocyanate in broccoli (the level of which broccoli producers have
no control over). The only real distinction is the bias that people have against
non-natural products.
3.The FD&C Act Provides Perverse Incentives for Producers to
Increase the Carcinogenicity of Common Food Products
Once we recognize that natural foods contain signicant amounts
of carcinogens, it becomes relevant to examine the incentives that the FD&C
Act provides to increase the carcinogenicity of natural foods. For centuries,
agricultural producers have attempted to breed plants that are resistant to in-
sects. In eect, farmers have chosen to breed plants that have a high content
of nature's pesticides.80 The FD&C Act simply fails to regulate the carcino-
gens that are present in natural foods, thereby allowing natural food producers
79See Aatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used as Human Foods: Proposed
Tolerance, 39 Fed. Reg. 42748 (1974). In determining what tolerance level to set, the Com-
missioner explicitly assessed the ability of peanut butter manufacturers to meet the tolerance.
Thus, in setting tolerances, the FDA must weigh the health risk posed by a particular sub-
stance with the higher prices caused by limiting the production of that substance. See id. The
agency. in deciding when to apply section 406, also implicitly weighs the benets provided by
particular foods. See Merrill, supra note 18, at 200.
80The conclusion that many toxic substances found in plants are natural pesticides was
originally made by Bruce N Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE
1256, 1258 (1983).
30to increase the carcinogenicity of their foods. Thus, the FD&C Act prohibits
the addition of pesticides that cause a very small risk of cancer and allows the
creation of new plant varieties that are intended to have similar carcinogenic
chemicals. The manual addition of pesticides is likely more cost-eective than
the breeding of plant strains, but the FD&C Act provides incentives to engage
in the less cost-eective activity. A similar problem can be seen with the FD&C
Act's treatment of animal drugs.
Again, for centuries meat producers have been selecting the biggest
animals to breed. Thus, animals that people eat today undoubtedly contain
more natural growth hormones than animals people ate years ago. However,
any attempt to add more natural growth hormones (such as estrogens) directly
will be met with strict FDA regulations. Thus, the FD&C Act once again
allows the indirect addition of carcinogenic substances and prohibits the direct
addition of the same or similar substances. Meat producers will have distorted
incentives to breed larger animals.
The perverse incentives given to plant and animal breeders once
again reects the bias that people have against non-natural foods81. People
view breeding as natural because it has been done for centuries. In contrast,
the advent of new technologies has made it possible to add chemicals to products
only recently. Thus, the addition of pesticides and animal drugs is regulated
while the natural selection of the same chemicals is not, despite the fact that
the ultimate eect is the same in both cases.
81This example highlights that non-natural foods are foods with synthetic chemicals or
foods made through processes that haven't historically been done in the past.
31B. The FD&C Act's Focus on the Natural vs. Non-natural Distinc-
tion Leads to Excessive
Litigation over the Wrong Issues and Produces Inconsistencies
As discussed above, the central background assumption on which
the food safety provisions are based is that nature is safe. Since the FD&C Act
assumes that nature is safe, only products that distort nature are regulated.
This is the true reason for the FDA's focus on the origin or purpose of food
constituents rather than on the nal composition of food sold to consumers. In
eect, the FDA deems a food to be adulterated based more on how the food
was created than on what harmful substances are in the food. This focus on a
food's recipe has led to a great deal of litigation that examines exactly how a
food was created. Furthermore, the recipe method of regulation has produced
severe inconsistencies in the law that cannot be justied.
J.Excessive Litigation over the Wrong Issues
ED#:70403870
The FDA and the courts have attempted to make the various pro-
visions of the FD&C Act workable, but their attempts have led to a great deal
of litigation over the application of various food standards. For example, the
FDA determined that some environmental contaminants were not produced by
man, but still caused signicant health risks to humans (such as aatoxins in
corn and peanuts). The FDA thus developed the inherency doctrine, which
led to litigation because the statutory standard was unclear. Furthermore, the
GRAS and prior sanctioned uses exceptions to the food additives denition have
32caused large expenses to determine exactly when particular substances are not
food additives.82 The FDA's attempts to make the Delaney Clause workable
have also led to a great deal of litigation.83
2.Inconsistencies
The many inconsistencies created by the FD&C Act have been
examined in the context of individual provisions. If we examine these incon-
sistencies, we can see that they are all caused by the focus on the recipe of a
food. FDA and court attempts to minimize the divergent treatment between
natural and non-natural substances illustrate these inconsistencies. The major
inconsistencies include:
(1) the dierential treatment aorded to added and non-added in-
gredients is inconsistent given the scope of the FDA's interpretation of added.
The inherency doctrine draws a false distinction between substances that are
naturally contained within a product, and substances that enter a product
through unavoidable natural processes.
(2) the bias against natural substances led to the GRAS and prior
sanctioned uses exception. This bias is highlighted by the fact that the GRAS
prior use exception and the prior sanctioned use exception apply to only the
82The FDA expends considerable resources compiling lists of GRAS substances. Cf HUTT
AND MERRILL, supra note 44, at 33241. Additionally, cases are often litigated regarding the
scope of the GRAS exception for various substances. See, e.g., United States v. An Article
of Food, 752 F.2d 11(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Articles of F~... Bualo Jerky, 456 F.
Supp. 207 (D. Neb. 1978), afJ'd per curium, 594 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
An Article of Food, 678 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1982). One commentator has noted that the prior
sanctioned uses exception has become a great source of business for archivists. See Merrill,
supra note 18, at 215.
83See,eg.. Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Public Citizen v.
Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (DC. Cir 1987), Scott v. Food and Drug Admin., 728 F.2d 322 (6th
Cir. 1984).
33actual uses before 1958. Thus, potassium nitrate can be added to meat because
it was added to meat before 1958, but it cannot be added to beverages.
(3) The FDA's attempts to limit the eects of the Delaney clause
have been partially successful and have led to additional inconsistencies. Courts
have upheld the FDA's constituents policy yet rejected the FDA's de minimis
policy in the context of color additives. This leads to the bizarre result that a
manufacturer can use a color additive known to contain a small amount of a
carcinogenic color additive, but cannot use minute quantities of the carcinogenic
color additive directly.
Aithough these examples do not exhaust the inconsistencies in the
FD&C Act, they are illustrative of the bizarre results caused by an inquiry into
a food's recipe. Such bizarre results, if publicly known, would certainly lead the
public to question the wisdom of the FD&C Act and the FDA.
C. Public Reaction and Distrust in the FDA
The risk from natural carcinogens has not been adequately brought
to the public's attention. Most people are aware of the carcinogenic potential
of saccharin; few are aware of the carcinogenic potential of peanuts. This is
partially a result of the statutory scheme of the FD&C Act. It is dicult to
judge the public's reaction if they were made aware of the carcinogenic potential
of natural foods. It is possible that they would call for stricter regulation of
natural foods, and it is also possible that they would call for less regulation
of non-natural foods. However, the public has not been given the chance to
examine the proper issues in regulating health risks: how much are we willing
34to pay to eliminate health risks, and how can we eliminate the health risks
eectively?84 The FD&C Act ensures that the media will receive a steady feed
of information about the carcinogenicity of various substances added to food.
In contrast, because the FD&C Act does not provide for the testing of natural
substances, the media will have relatively little information to report regarding
the carcinogenicity of natural substances. As a result of this dichotomy, people
improperly presume that the risk from carcinogenic food additives is large and
can be easily eliminated through a strict regulatory system.
The current regulatory system involves a potential indirect cost.
Although the public is not currently aware of the extent to which natural foods
cause cancer, they may be made aware in the future. If this happens, the eec-
tiveness of the FDA in protecting the public from health risks will undoubtedly
be questioned. This will lead people to distrust the FDA and lead people to
question other FDA policies. Trust destroying events carry much greater weight
in people's minds than trust-building events.85 Thus, one negative event can
eectively destroy much of the public trust that the FDA has managed to ac-
cumulate over the years.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
A. A Return to the Air Pollution Analogy
The air pollution analogy described above provides a good example
84Congress has not attempted to address these important public policy questions in a com-
prehensive manner. Thus, although these issues appeared when Congress overrode the FDA's
proposed ban of saccharin, these issues have not appeared when other useful substances have
been banned by the FDA. Additionally, the issue of how much people are willing to give up
to forego dangerous natural substances (such as peanuts) has not been properly addressed in
a public forum.
85See Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RIsK ANALYSIS 675, 677
(1993).
35of the proper regulatory approach to control the health risks of cancer. The case
of global warming caused by CO2 is illustrative. As the consequences of global
warming have become more predictable, many have suggested formulating poli-
cies to eliminate the future eects of global warming. The analogy between the
risk of global warming and the risk of cancer is close: both situations involve
cumulative, long-term risks; uncertain science and signicant background lev-
els. The most recent proposals for eliminating the potential eects of global
warring have concluded that two stages should be distinguished: rst, a tar-
get should be set for the total atmospheric CO2 level; second, the total level
of atmospheric CO2 should be achieved as cheaply as possible. Thus, the most
workable proposals for the elimination of carbon dioxide allow countries to meet
their reduction requirements by lowering background levels of carbon dioxide
(by planting trees, for example). Countries will thus be able to meet the re-
quirements cost-eectively. A similar two stage system needs to be enacted to
eectively reduce the health risk of cancer. This system will also likely call for
a reduction of risk by lowering the background levels of cancer.
B. Statutory Amendments
1.The First Step. Setting an Acceptable Safety Levelfor Cancer
Risks
The safety standards in the food safety provisions of the FD&C
Act were not designed to deal with the cumulative long-term health risks posed
by cancer. It is relatively simple to determine if poisons or pathogenic sub-
stances are safe. If people get sick or die then a substance is unsafe; if there
36is no observed eect than a substance is safe. The FDA thus has the technical
expertise to establish a denition of safety for poisons.86 In eect, Congress
mandated the FDA to approve food additives only after they had been shown
to not cause signicant harm. However, the FDA is incapable of dening safe
levels of exposure to cancer because of its long-term, cumulative eects. There
is not a denite no observed eect level for carcinogenic substances. Thus,
Congress' safety mandate in this context is insucient. A specic safety level
for carcinogens should be determined by Congress.
The rst stage in the two-stage system for the ecient reduction
of the risks from carcinogens calls for a determination of the target level of
risk. The basic inquiry in the determination of the target level of risk involves
deciding how much we are willing to spend to eliminate the risks of cancer. This
is essentially a political question: it is a matter of public policy to decide how
to divide society's resources among a variety of laudable goals. It will not be
simple for Congress to set this acceptable safety level for cancer. The total risk
of cancer caused by substances in our diet has been convincingly estimated by
various scientists.87 However, FDA scientists should develop more conclusive
studies that show the extent to which natural or traditional foods contribute to
cancer risk.88 Additionally, the FDA should compile a list of traditional foods
86The safety level for poisons 15 equal to the no observed eect level (NOEL) divided by
one hundred.
87See, e.g., Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks
of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1192, 1256 (1981)
(estimating that approximately 35 percent of all cancer deaths are caused by diet).
88Dr. Robert J. Scheuplein has estimated that the total risk of cancer from traditional foods
over a lifetime is 7.6 percent. See Charles E. Morris. Realities and Risks, FooD ENGINEER-
ING 63 (Aug. 1990). In contrast, Dr. Scheuplein estimates the risk created by non-traditional
foods to be approximately.1 percent. However, his methodology has encountered some criti-
cism from non-scientic sources. See supra note 15.
37and their carcinogenic potential. Congress can have hearings on the
EDt:70403870 reliability of the quantitative risk assessment model
and consider the uncertainty associated with assessing the health risks of cancer.
Based on all of this information, Congress would be able to deter-
mine an acceptable safety level for carcinogens grounded on a thorough assess-
ment of the costs and benets associated with such regulation. Congress should
also assign another agency to assess the technical feasibility of reducing carcino-
genic chemicals in traditional foods. Congress would be free to carve out special
exceptions for certain products, but would be able assess the costs and benets
of doing so.89 Additionally, this approach would allow Congress to explicitly
take public fear of cancer into account.90 Central to the eective implementa-
tion of the acceptable safety level for cancer is an eective risk communication
strategy. The public must be made aware of the risks of cancer and the ability
to eliminate these risks in dierent contexts.
2.The second step: making the food safety standards consistent to
allow cost-eective reduction in cancer risks
The adoption of an acceptable safety level for carcinogens would im-
mediately eliminate many of the inconsistencies of the FD&C Act. The Delaney
89We can contrast this situation with the saccharin saga, in which Congress determined
that the benets of saccharin outweighed the health costs of saccharin. After the saccharin
saga, many legal commentators stated that a reform in the law was necessary to allow the
FDA to assess the benets of a food additive before banning it. See HLTr A.ND MERRILL.
supra note 44. at 927-28. However, it may be unwise to allow the FDA to make such a broad
cost-benet analysis. The FDA is certainly not qualied to calculate the non-health costs and
benets of banning a particular additive. The acceptable safety level approach would thus
allow this cost-benet analysis to be considered by Congress with information regarding a
variety of costs and benets.
90supra text accompanying note 8. There is an increased psychological fear of cancer.
However, it is unclear as to whether the increased fear is at least partially due to a rational
assessment that cancer deaths should be avoided more than other deaths because of the
debilitating eect of cancer.
38clause would no longer be necessary; Congress would replace the absolutism of
the Delaney clause with a the acceptable safety level after explicitly considering
the costs and benets of reducing the risk of cancer. Once the Delaney clause is
removed, the constituents policy, GRAS constituents policy and the de minimis
exception are no longer necessary. Section 402(a)( 1) should be amended to
apply the acceptable safety level in the context of all suspected carcinogenic
foods, thus eliminating the vexatious
added versus non-added distinction.91 Section 406 would also have
to be substantially amended. Instead of allowing the FDA to set tolerances for
unavoidable and added constituents, Congress could give the FDA the discretion
to set tolerances above the acceptable safety level if the FDA concludes that
banning such a substance would have serious detrimental health or nutritional
eects.92 As under the present section 406, the FDA would be able to assess the
technical feasibility of eliminating the carcinogen when establishing tolerances.
Additionally, the FDA would retain the ability to set informal action levels
under section 402(a)( 1).
Perhaps the biggest change in the current system would be the
removal of the GRAS prior common use and the prior sanctioned uses exception
91Although this paper has addressed section 402(a)(1) in the context of carcinogens, the
added versus nonadded distinction can be criticized in the context of other health eects. The
distinction could be eliminated entirely. Congress was originally concerned about over-zealous
FDA enforcement against natural foods when it enacted this distinction. However, the FDA
should be granted the discretion to bring suits against the most dangerous products, whether
the products are natural or added. If anything, the FDA would more likely be biased against
added foods given people's (including FDA ocial's) prejudice against additives.
92This is the proper context for the FDA to utilize its expertise in determining whether to
ban a product. Thus, although the FDA's discretion might increase, the same concerns raised
about the FDA broadly weighing the costs and benets of banning a substance would not
apply here.
39to the food additive denition. Section 409 would be reformulated to allow prior
common use to be an exception for requiring premarket approval, but not in the
unique context of carcinogens. Additionally, the prior common use exception
would be formulated to allow new uses of a substance formerly and commonly
used in other ways. The amendment of the food additives scheme would have the
eect of shifting the burden of proof to the regulated industry to demonstrate
that their products meet the acceptable safety level for cancer.93 This burden-
shifting would occur for many substances that were formerly GRAS or prior
sanctioned.94 The FDA would also have the ability to set tolerances under
section 409 that reect the same criteria as are proposed for section 406.
C. A Brief Assessment of the Proposed Statutory Scheme
The proposed statutory scheme eliminates many of the disadvan-
tages of the current food safety provisions:
(1)most importantly, it would eliminate the statutory bias against
non-natural substances in the context of carcinogens95.
(2)because the bias against non-natural substances would be elim-
inated, the food safety provisions would not needlessly focus on the recipe of
foods. Instead, the proposed scheme would lead to the elimination of the great-
est risks to cancer.
93Additionally, the color additives, animal drugs, and pesticide provisions would all be
amended to adopt the acceptable safety level standard for cancer.
94The burden shift would not take eect for GRAS substances whose safety had been shown
through scientic procedures.
95The scheme would, however, retain the bias against non-natural substances for short term
health eects. Thus, newly created foods would still be forced to prove that they are safe (they
are not poisonous, for example) in the non-carcinogen context. This bias is most likely not
irrational, but merely a proper assumption that foods that we have eaten in the past are not
poisonous if consumed in normal amounts.
40(3)the scheme would allow Congress and the public to address the
important issue of how much we are willing to pay to reduce the risk of cancer.
(4)it eliminates the perverse incentives of meat and crop producers
to increase the carcinogenicity of their products.
(5)the scheme will inevitably lead producers of products that have
been banned to seek cost-eective means of eliminating carcinogens from their
products.
(6) the new amendments will eliminate the inconsistencies of the
prior standards, which led to excessive litigation and possible distrust of the
FDA.
(7) the new food safety standards will no longer exacerbate the
public's irrational bias against non-natural carcinogens. Instead, the public will
be made aware of the largest risks of cancer, whether they are from natural or
non-natural sources.
(8) the scheme will ensure the saccharin incident will not happen
in the future. If a product is necessary for nutritional reasons, then tolerances
will be set under section 406 or section 409. Products that can meet these
tolerances will be approved, while products that cannot meet these tolerances
will be banned. Thus, a situation similar to saccharin cornering the market
while cyclamate posed less risks would never occur.
The main criticisms of the proposed statutory scheme will likely
stem from the fact that premarket approval will be required for many substances
that had formerly been GRAS or prior sanctioned. First, it can be argued that
41the proposed scheme will increase the costs of regulating substances dramati-
cally.96 However, the costs of regulating these foods need to be weighed against
the benets of regulating these foods, which is exactly what Congress will do
when determining the acceptable safety level for cancer. Undoubtedly, Congress
will choose to save resources by raising the level of risk required in order to deem
a substance unsafe. Thus, although the cost of regulating natural foods will in-
crease, the cost of regulating non-natural foods will decrease. In eect, resources
will be shifted to eliminate the risks of cancer in a cost-eective manner. This
is exactly the goal of eective regulation. Second, it will be argued that people
have the right to choose to eat peanut butter if they want, despite the fact that
it causes cancer. However, this argument is not consistent with the fact that
we currently don't allow people to eat food additives or pesticides that cause
cancer, despite the fact that people may really want to eat those substances. We
have made a societal judgment that certain foods should not be eaten, despite
the fact that the occasional consumer might want to eat the food after being
fully informed of the risk. Third, it may be argued that the use of food additives
will ourish after Congress increases the standard needed to show a carcinogenic
96Alternatively, instead of making the food safety standards consistent by requiring premar-
ket approval for all substances in the unique context of cancer, we could have a system that
abandons premarket approval for all substances in the unique context of cancer. Thus, the
FDA would be limited to enforcing the acceptable safety level through an application of section
402(a)( 1). This option would have the advantage of conserving the extensive resources that
currently are devoted to testing substances for their carcinogenicity. However, this scheme is
awed because the FDA would not be able to determine the carcinogenicity of certain foods.
In order to eectively enforce section 402(a)( 1), either the health eects of a food must be
observed or the FDA must be made aware of the food's carcinogenic constituents. The nature
of cancer precludes the rst alternative. The second alternative is problematic because the
FDA would only know the carcinogenicity of constituents that it had examined under the
previous system. Additionally, the FDA would not know the all of the chemicals contained
within agricultural commodities. Thus, section 402(a)(1) would likely be enforced against
only processed foods.
42substance to be unsafe. Thus, color and food additives could barely pass the
safety test and then be added to foods in large amounts. This argument has
two aws: rst, it ignores the fact that additives are rarely used in such large
amounts; second, the food that the additives would be added to could be seized
under section 402(a)( 1) if the government could prove that the food did not
meet the acceptable safety level for cancer.
D. An Eective Risk Communication Strategy
Eective risk communication to the public is necessary to eectively
implement the proposed statutory scheme. Recent literature has developed con-
cerning exactly how risks should be communicated to the public.97 The proper
goal of risk communication should be to raise[] the level of understanding of
relevant issues or actions and satisify] those involved that they are adequately
informed within the limits of available knowledge.98 Risk communication thus
has the worthy goal of allowing the public and the government to make informed
decisions. Eective communication is a function of both the process of creating
risk messages and the content of those messages. Two important themes result
from risk communication research99 First, both the process and the content of
risk messages should be oriented towards the intended audience. Second, the
most eective risk messages are created in an open forum with dialogue between
the public and the risk communicators. Communication should be a two-way
97See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences, IMPROVING RI5K COMMUNICATION
(1989); Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 RI5K ANALYSIS
403 (1986); Lester B. Lave, Health and Safety Risk Analyses: Information for Better Deci-
sions, 236 SCIENCE 291(1987);
98National Academy of Sciences. IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 26(1989).
99See id at 9.
43process. Communicating with citizens about risks can not only increase their
understanding of risks, but also increase their desire to participate in reducing
risks. To be informative, communications should contain facts relevant to the
public's broad conception of risk and recognize that the public perceives risk
as more than merely the expected number of fatalities from an activity. The
messages should be formulated by public relations experts together with scien-
tists. Additionally, risk communications must come from a credible source to
be eective. Finally, risk communicators should use the media more eectively
in helping inform the public about risks.100
The results in risk communication research can be helpful in formu-
lating policies for the eective communication of the risks from cancer. Central
to the communication should be a comparison between the risks of cancer from
natural foods, non-natural foods, cooking and food preparation, and non-dietary
sources. Comparing the risks from cancer caused by these dierent sources will
give the public the proper perspective from which to base its decisions.101 The
FDA should create a task force to formulate risk communication policies. This
task force should be composed of both public relations experts and scientists.
100See Slovic, supra note 94, at 410.
101Risk communication research has warned against the hazards of using risk comparisons
haphazardly. Any attempt to compare risks that dier widely in nature is dangerous because
people dene risk more robustly than merely the expected number of fatalities. Thus, making
risk comparisons between the risk from skiing and the risk from cancer are generally useless to
the public. Furthermore, such comparisons may foster public distrust of regulatoiy agencies,
leading the public to believe that such agencies are not doing their job of protecting the
public. However, comparing the risks from dierent causes of cancer can be useful to the
public because it accurately informs the public about dierent methods of preventing one
disease, and the limitations of those methods. See generally, Emilie Roth et al., What Do We
Know About A'faking Risk Comparisons?, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 375 (1990); Paul Slovic et al.,
What Should We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?, 10 RIsK ANALYSIS 389 (1990);
Richard Wilson and E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction,
236 SCIENCE 267 (1987); JoHN URQUHART & KLAUS HEILMANN, RISK WATCH: THE
ODDS OF LIFE (1984).
44The task force should consider both the technical data given by FDA scien-
tists and the likely public response to various risk communications. The task
force should adopt an open policy with the public and share its interim results
with all interested participants. Importantly, the task force should not conceal
the uncertainty in the science surrounding the estimation of the health risks
from cancer. Awareness of the uncertainty in the science is necessary to make
informed decisions. Before disseminating ocial risk messages, the task force
should conduct limited trial runs to gauge the public reaction. By having an
open policy, the task force will be able to properly address the concerns that
its audience has. The public condence in the FDA is higher than in other gov-
ernmental bodies; thus, the risk communications from the FDA will be trusted
to at least some degree by the public. The task force should also try to eec-
tively communicate to the media and properly utilize this free source of risk
communication. Ultimately, the task force should publish a report which could
be disseminated to the public. Congress may wish to establish an oversight
committee on this task force to ensure that the public's concerns are being met.
E. Alternative Regulations
In response to the inability of the current regulatory system to
protect the public from the chronic risks of cancer, it has been suggested that the
regulatory tool of labeling should be considered.102 Certainly, if the proposed
statutory scheme is enacted, the public will demand information concerning how
they can avoid cancer risks by changing their diet. However, labeling in the
102See Peter B. Hutt, Food and Drug Law: A Strong and Continuing Tradition, 37 FOoD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 123. 130 (1982).
45context of cancer risks has some serious drawbacks. Perhaps the ideal solution
is a broader public education system concerning cancer. The public should be
made aware of the inability of the government's regulation of cancer risks to
increase our life expectancy signicantly.
I.Labeling
The principle behind labeling the risks from cancer is that society
can conserve resources wasted by intrusive regulation and increase individual
autonomy. Thus, the FDA would be shifting to a strategy of indirectly pro-
moting, rather than directly protecting, the public health.103 The State of
California has at least partially shifted to such a regulatory strategy in the con-
text of carcinogens.104 Such a labeling approach, however, may be unwise for
three main reasons. First, it would be extremely dicult to require agricultural
commodities to be labeled.105 Any requirement of labeling for processed foods
but not for raw agricultural commodities would exacerbate the public's bias
against non-natural foods.106 Second, the communication of relatively minor
risks from carcinogens may dilute the eect of existing warnings.107 If trivial
103Id.
104On November 4, 1986, California enacted Proposition 65 by public initiative. Proposition
65 requires the governor to publish a list of natural and synthetic compounds known to
cause cancer. Food producers are responsible for providing warning statements on products
containing these chemicals. See generally Peter B. Hut?, Application of Proposition 65 to
Food, Drugs, Medical Devices, and Cosmetics, in National Legal Center for the Public Interest,
CLEAN WATER AND ToxiC WASTE: AT WHAT COST FOR WHAT GAIN? 23; Matthew
L. Kuryla, California's Proposition 6S and the Chemical Hazard Warning: Risk Management
Under the New Code of Popular Outrage, 8 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 103 (1988).
105The FDA has encountered this problem in other food labeling contexts. See Hurr &
MERRILL, supra note 44.
106This is a major aw in Proposition 65, which exempts carcinogenic substances that nat-
urally occur in food from labeling requirements. Thus, peanuts (and peanut butter) need not
be labeled because their carcinogens naturally occur, as dened by the law.
107See Lam Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the Right to Know from the Need
to Know About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 381 (1994).
46risks are labeled along with signicant risks, the public will be overloaded with
information, which they will not be able to process eectively. People will not
be able to distinguish between the trivial risks and the signicant risks. Third,
because people tend to overestimate low-probability risks, they will undoubt-
edly overreact to warning statements about carcinogens. Such overreactions
will involve social costs because useful products will no longer be purchased
because of an irrational fear. Similarly, such warnings may cause consumers to
focus on the risks of carcinogenic substances and ignore their benets.108 The
deciencies in labeling derive from the fact that consumers need a great deal of
information (such as risk comparisons) to perceive risks accurately.109 There is
likely not enough room on a label to provide this information, and any labeling
that results in incomplete information will likely be harmful.110 Warning labels
are ideally used in situations where useful products pose acute risks that are
easily avoided.111 This is simply not the situation for carcinogenic foods.
2.Public education
Public education, as with labeling, provides the advantages of con-
serving resources from intrusive regulation and increasing individual autonomy.
Eective public education campaigns would entail eective risk communication.
108See id. at 387. For instance, requiring a warning on nitrites would not allow the consumer
to weigh the fact that nitrites protect against lethal food poisoning.
109Some commentators have suggested ways around these deciencies by examining alterna-
tives to providing warnings about cancer on labels. See id at 391. The alternatives seek to
provide information to consumers while avoiding the problems of information overload and
overreaction. Some suggestions involve having labels contain a chronic risk code, perhaps
dierentiating among ve levels of risk. See id. Other commentators have suggested using a
logarithmic scale to convey risk information, although this approach may mislead consumers
because of their unfamiliarity with logarithmic scales. See id
110The goal of labeling, as one form of risk communication, should be to encourage the public
to make informed choices.
111See id. at 399.
47In the public education context, eective risk communication would involve help-
ing the consumer to make informed purchasing decisions. Thus, people should
be informed of the limits on their ability to increase their life span through
dietary choices.112 The public should also be informed of the uncertainty in the
science surrounding estimating the risk of cancer. Public education can take
place through many media.
The FDA could use talk papers, press releases and articles to dis-
seminate its messages. Additionally, the FDA may wish to compile booklets
regarding cancer risks from various foods in our diet and make them available
for consumers at supermarkets. Public education, in contrast to labeling, pro-
vides another advantage of being able to inform the public of the risk of cancer
from cooking and preparing foods, which seems to represent a signicant per-
centage of the dietary cancer risk. Additionally, it allows the FDA to use the
media, which is a free source of risk communication. However, the FDA must
be able to eectively interact with the media.
It is important to note that the goal of public education is not
necessarily to help consumers avoid the risks of cancer. Consumers, after being
informed of the carcinogenic risks of traditional foods, may wish to continue
eating those foods. They will very likely decide that they value the pleasure
they derive from food much more than the possibility of living an additional
10 days. Furthermore, consumers would be made to understand that the FDA
would not be abdicating its responsibility to protect the public health. Rather,
112See Hut?, supra note 99, at 130.
48the consumers would recognize that the minor health risk from carcinogens in
foods cannot be easily avoided. Ultimately, increased public awareness may
lead us to transfer society's resources to the elimination of more serious health
risks than cancer.113 Certainly, increased public awareness can only help our
democratic system of government function more eectively.
CONCLUSION
A careful examination of the current regulation of carcinogens leads
us to the inevitable conclusion that a change is needed. Furthermore, the prob-
lems of the regulation of carcinogens cannot be simply attributed to the infa-
mous Delaney clause. The problems stem from the fact that the food safety
provisions in general carry an implicit assumption that natural food is risk-free.
The Delaney clause, along with the premarket approval system and other fac-
tors, merely exacerbates the costly eects of maintaining this assumption in the
context of carcinogens. The reforms that are necessary involve creating special
safety standards that apply for all carcinogens, regardless of whether the car-
cinogen is natural or somehow added to a food. The reforms thus shift the focus
to the constituents of a food rather than how the constituents became a part of
the food. This focus on the food itself, rather than its recipe, will lead to greater
eciency in the elimination of carcinogenic health risks. Crucial to the imple-
mentation of these new proposals is a system that eectively communicates the
113Many have observed that the current costs associated with microbiological contamination
are extremely high and have been relatively ignored. See Sanford A. Miller, The Saga of
Chicken Little and Rambo, 51 J. ASS'N OF FooD & DRUG OmCLALS 196 (1987). Leading
ocials in the FDA have consistently stated that the primary hazard in the food supply stems
from food-borne disease. Virgil Wodicka, FDA 's Objectives in Food Today, 27 FooD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 59 (1972); Frank Young, Weighing Food Safety Risks, 23 FDA Consumer, No. 7,
at 8 (1989).
49risk of cancer to the public. People have an irrational bias against non-natural
carcinogenic foods. If people were made aware of the true risks of cancer from
various sources in our diet, they would make decisions more eectively. In our
democratic system of government, it is crucial that the public is able to make
eective decisions. Thomas Jeerson once said If we think (the people) not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion. Whatever de-
cisions the public will ultimately make, the time has certainly arrived for those
decisions to be informed ones.
50